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Introduction 
 
Like education, health etc. public service broadcasting (PSB) is a merit good rather than a 
public good service, as it satisfies only one of the two properties that define a public good: it is 
non rival. However unlike public goods, it is technologically feasible to exclude users from 
large parts of the service (although currently would be very expensive in the case of television 
and not possible for radio); whether the latter happens is a matter of public policy choice or, in 
the case of commercial broadcasters, company choice.  As things currently stand, if a user only 
uses BBC’s radio services, the web based BBC news and time delayed viewing of television 
programmes (the BBC iPlayer “loophole”), there is no obligation to pay a licence fee.  
Public service broadcasting by the BBC is a “merit” good given the very large spill overs the 
use of this service entails - which would be under-provided in a commercial broadcasting only 
market. This no longer refers to any limitations on the supply side because of an ‘infrastructure 
network’ (spectrum) scarcity as it did in the past. Such limitations led to high barriers to entry 
that justified public intervention in PSB to ensure provision. Given the advent of digital 
television, a plethora of channels can be transmitted. This, combined with catch up TV, on-
demand services, satellite, cable, and fast broadband means that there is no longer scarcity in 
spectrum or in the capacity of any other platform used to deliver content. 
Given its mission, the BBC uniquely addresses licence fee payers not only as consumers, but 
also as citizens, provides services for users outside of this country for free (BBC World 
Service), and competes through its commercial arm (BBC Worldwide) internationally. In all 
these aspects of service the BBC has an impact on the UK economy. Public service goods 
principles typically include provision attributes such as universality, equality, accessibility, and 
affordability (if not free at the point of use). However in the case of the BBC additional 
principles need to be observed including the promotion of social cohesion, as well as 
impartiality and distinctiveness. In fact there are six broad purposes which the Government set 
in the current Charter that include the above principles, and imply large spill-over benefits: a) 
Sustain citizenship and civil society through informing, b) promote education and learning, c) 
stimulate creativity and cultural excellence,  d) represent the UK and its nations, regions and 
                                                          
1 Dr Xeni Dassiou is a Reader of Economics in the Department of Economics at City University London and the 
Director of the Centre for Competition and Regulatory Policy (CCRP). The views expressed in this report are 
personal and do not represent the views of BBC Trust, the University, or the CCRP. The author is grateful to 
Richard Price, Chief Executive of the ORR, for a helpful discussion on the regulatory framework of rail and roads 
and the challenges facing ORR as the regulator of the sector. The responsibility for any errors or omissions in 
this report lies exclusively with the author.  
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communities, e) bring the UK to the world and the world to the UK and f) deliver to the public 
the benefits of emerging communication technologies and services.  
The BBC’s independence from the government is ensured by the fact that it receives its funding 
from the licence fee payers and hence it is ultimately answerable to them. To some extent this 
may defeat the principle of affordability in provision for some low income households; the 
licence fee is regressive and non-proportionate as it depends neither on the income of the user, 
nor on the degree of use of the service. On the other hand the payment of the fee by a very large 
number people ensures a low per user price, partially restoring affordability. Moreover, it 
provides certainty in funding for the corporation, which allows it to take risks and invest in 
innovation and quality. It is also relatively easier and cheaper to enforce and collect. 
The licence fee is compulsory for anyone who accesses live television programming 
irrespective of whether he/she uses this access to view BBC or other PSB programming funded 
by the licence fee.  Coercion is not unheard of in public service markets, but legitimacy is 
required for this (this legitimacy requirement together with universality seems to be satisfied 
given a high willingness to pay at 73%,  and the fact that 99% of households use the BBC each 
week [BBC, 2015, pp. 67-68]). For example, there is compulsory education up to the age of 
16, some degree of coercion regarding childhood vaccination programmes funded by the state, 
etc. However what is rather unique is that while such services are free at the point of use, in 
the case of PSB there is compulsion in payment rather than in consumption2.   Compulsion in 
payment is common for PSB in other countries, for example Germany or Finland, where 
payment takes the form of a household levy – the latter leaves room for more progressive forms 
of payment allowing the levy to vary according to socio-economic factors such as income, size 
of household, etc. Price setting by an independent external economic regulator might ensure a 
stable source of funding that retains the independence of the BBC from the government while 
also protecting and promoting the interests of licence fee payers as citizens and as consumers 
funding the service. 
The objective of this report is to look at the arrangements for the economic regulation of two   
public sector companies in rail & road, despite the difference in the funding approach. We 
analyse the regulatory framework in rail and roads for the infrastructure rail company Network 
Rail and the motorways and major roads company Highways England, both of which are non-
commercial companies like the BBC (although both Network Rail and the BBC are recipients 
of commercial income as well). We explain the price setting and general funding arrangements 
in these two companies specifically and in the sector in general, and examine the role of ORR 
as an independent economic regulator advising the government on the funding of these two 
state companies by monitoring the cost efficiency of both, and using periodic review price 
setting to determine the access charges paid by passenger and freight rail operators to NR. We 
draw out some issues that may serve as lessons in price setting by a potential future independent 
external regulator advising the government on the level of BBC funding through price setting. 
                                                          
2 The author can only think of compulsory motor insurance; the compulsion exists to prevent adverse selection 
where only bad drivers select to insure. This would cause a sharp increase in premiums by insurers wishing to 
reflect the increased risks of claiming by the insured who in their vast majority are high risk drivers. This will lead 
to a sharp reduction in affordability of car insurance prices. Hence the universality in motor insurance means 
that good drivers, who do not need insurance, subsidise bad drivers, who do, to prevent the market failure of 
under provision in the market for motor insurance.  
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We highlight potential common themes emerging such as crowding out effects, single till 
versus dual till approaches, benchmarking and internal market arrangements.   
 
Economic Regulation in the UK 
 
Independent economic regulation was initially designed in the UK following privatisation to 
reassure investors in utilities regarding the returns on their assets. During the 1980s and 1990s 
telecoms, energy, water etc. were privatised. As investments in such industries typically have 
long lives and pay back over a long period, they needed to be assured that the returns from such 
investments would not be unduly subjected to day to day politics or changes in government. 
Apart from being a mechanism of assurance to the investors of such privatised utilities, 
regulators established a stable framework of an incentives based model of economic regulation 
under which investments are made. This ensured that such investments would promote the long 
term interests of the consumers by improvements in productive efficiency and then passing on 
the gains from productive efficiency to the consumers in the form of lower prices after a 
reasonable amount of time to allow investors a reasonable return.  
More specifically, the price setting was based on the price cap regulation model (RPI-X) which 
tries to balance between the benefits of productive and allocative efficiency. The system sets a 
clear incentive for the regulated company to exceed the “X” efficiency target of cost reduction 
and pocket the extra savings for the duration of the periodic review, thus providing an attractive 
return from the achievement of operating costs savings in the short run (for the duration of a 5 
year period), before passing on any costs savings, alongside any quality improvements to the 
consumers in the form of lower prices in the next periodic review. This trade-off process 
between productive and allocative efficiency imitates the process in a market where 
competition is effective. Investment is attracted by profits and eventually these profits are 
competed away as they translate into lower prices benefiting consumers, as it happens in a 
competitive market, albeit at the somewhat slower rate of a 5 year period, to allow for the long 
term nature of such investments. Hence, incentive-based regulation in the form of an RPI-X 
price cap imitates the competitive process by balancing between the need for short run profits 
to attract investment and productive efficiency and long run gains in allocative efficiency 
through lower prices.  
Economic regulation agencies were able during their operation for more than 30 years to 
accumulate specialist expertise far greater than any mainstream government department, by 
becoming depositories of expertise knowledge. The independence of the regulators was 
underpinned by the fact that they were funded by levies on the respective industries they 
oversaw. Their personnel moves around the regulator body enhancing their knowledge on a 
specific sector, whereas mainstream civil service would enhance breadth rather than depth. In 
the earlier years, the regulators were given narrowly defined duties to promote competition 
where possible.  Regulation was seen as a transition measure; the target was that as competition 
took hold in the most contestable parts of each industry, the regulator would increasingly focus 
on the network parts of these industries.  
This process was kept in place until competition removed the need for ex ante price regulation 
as consumers become protected by the rigours of competition that induce producers to set 
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prices close to costs and by the enforcement of competition law protection through ex-post 
regulation. Typically, this was achieved by vertical unbundling that separated the contestable 
segments of an industry from the infrastructure parts with natural monopoly characteristics. 
This allowed the introduction of competition in the former and the continuation of price cap 
regulation and access pricing determination through period reviews in the latter. Hence 
competition flourished in the generation segments of gas and electricity as well as the retail 
parts of gas, electricity, telecoms, mobile operators, etc. This led to the removal of price 
regulation in such segments. On the other hand, networks in all utilities such as energy, 
telecoms, rail etc. that are still price regulated monopolies (e.g. National Grid, Network Rail), 
or regional monopolies (e.g. water companies in England, electricity distribution companies), 
or near monopolies (e.g. Openreach) are still subjected to increasingly complex price setting 
reviews and network access setting arrangements. 
The opening of previously ex ante regulated segments to the forces of competition was 
reflected by the introduction of legislation that broadened the remit of many regulators by 
granting them concurrent powers to monitor and enforce competition in the sector each 
oversaw, in tandem with the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA, a body resulting from 
the merger of the OFT and the Competition Commission in April 2014).  Both ORR and 
Ofcom, as well as the majority of regulators, were granted such concurrent powers.  
The duty to promote competition is a duty to protect a process rather than a set of outcomes. In 
more recent years, while the government still adheres to the idea that independent regulation is 
essential for promoting predictability for investors, the nature of independent regulation has 
shifted from processes (such as promoting and enforcing competition, controlling or punishing 
monopolistic pricing etc.) to delivering specific outcomes desired by the government, many of 
which fall within the government’s policy of delivering infrastructure (Tutton, 2014).   To some 
extent this is reasonable. Developments in technology, combined with corresponding changes 
in the society and business requirements have led to a continuous evolution in regulated 
infrastructure to satisfy these needs. As a result, regulatory frameworks and policy objectives 
have changed to reflect the changes in priorities. An obvious example is the rapid platform 
convergence in broadcasting, where broadband has become an alternative platform to 
television, in the form of catch up TV, internet television (IPTV) and the emergence of over 
the top services rapidly blurring the lines between broadband and telecoms regulation, both of 
which are overseen by Ofcom. Given that the BBC is one of the direct beneficiaries of this 
convergence by enhancing its ability to reach audiences, and given its mission to promote for 
the benefit of the public emerging communication technologies and services, the BBC has 
agreed to contribute to the funding of broadband roll-out, although this funding is set to end 
under the latest licence fee settlement.  
Across the regulated infrastructure sectors there is an investment requirement for regulated 
companies not only to maintain existing infrastructure but also to upgrade and build new 
infrastructure, especially in sectors where there is scarcity as we see below. For some 
industries, like rail and roads, this funding requirement is provided by the government: 
Network Rail (NR) is partially funded by the government, through a lump sum grant that 
represents more than 60% of its income, while Highways England (HE) is wholly government 
funded.   
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Economic regulators are not independent from the government but rather they act as agents of 
the government, who is the principal, and on the government’s behalf they perform economic 
regulation in the form of price setting and promote competition as appropriate. Ultimately they 
exist to champion the interests of present and future consumers. The government sets ex ante 
the broad guidelines for the regulator in the form of high level outcomes that need to be 
achieved during a set time framework, but not how these should be achieved, as this will be 
determined by the sector with the regulator at the helm monitoring and enforcing compliance. 
So the government guidelines to the regulator for what should be achieved should be outcomes 
based, rather than inputs or specific outputs based.  More specific and/or more frequent 
instructions from the government to the regulator, in terms of what the latter is meant to achieve 
focusing in the form of specific outcomes/projects can both undermine the process of regulation 
and the independence of the regulator, and therefore the credibility of the process itself. 
 
Rail and Road Regulation  
 
The Office of Rail and Road (ORR) is the independent safety and economic regulator for 
Britain's railways and the Highways England monitor. Its duties involve the application of ex 
ante price regulation on Network Rail (as well as HS1, Channel Tunnel, Northern Ireland, 
Crossrail, Heathrow). ORR also sets the outputs that NR needs to deliver (regulatory outputs) 
(train service reliability, network enhancements and maintenance, health and safety), and 
overlooks funding arrangements (track access charges, network grant and other single till 
income from property, stations, car parking etc.). It has the role of protecting rail consumers’ 
interests and rights, has concurrency powers (ex post regulation) and a role in the development 
of European rail markets and regulation. ORR is responsible for track access charges 
arrangements and open access (i.e. introducing competition between train operators in parts of 
the rail network, see below) and is responsible for accountability and efficiency monitoring.  
Finally as we mentioned above, the ORR assumed in 2015 the additional role of acting as the 
efficiency monitor of Highways England.  
Competition in rail was introduced though the privatisation of British Rail in 1994, following 
vertical unbundling of the company into 4 different parts, the infrastructure network, passenger 
train operators, freight operators, and ROSCOs (rolling stock operating companies) described 
in turn below.  
The infrastructure network Railtrack, was a group of companies that owned the infrastructure 
network (the tracks, stations, signalling, shops, etc.). In 2002 Railtrack went effectively 
bankrupt after experiencing major financial difficulties and most of its operations went to 
Network Rail, a company limited by government guarantee (did not distribute dividends). In 
2014 the Office of National Statistics (ONS) announced that Network Rail was to be classified 
as a central government body in the public sector in compliance with the European System of 
National Accounts 2010 which came into force across the EU in September 2014. Following 
its reclassification, NR’s net debt passed on the government books and the company is no 
longer able to borrow from the capital markets. The Government has assumed a new role in 
agreeing material changes in NR’s business plan following a loan agreement that puts an 
P a g e  | 6 
 
 
 
Dassiou, Xeni |  12 JANUARY 2016 
absolute cap on NR’s funding and poses questions as to whether the company will be able to 
deliver its outputs within the cap.  
NR is a monopoly network that receives income from track access charges, e.g. income from 
train operators and freight operators for access to its infrastructure, a lump sum grant from the 
government, and income from its commercial operations (e.g. property income, see below). 
The government separately for England and Wales, and for Scotland specifies what it wants to 
buy through the high level output specifications (HLOS) and statement of funds available 
(SoFAs).  The ORR must confirm if the HLOS are affordable given the funds available. The 
HLOS, SoFAs, financial incentives and selected customer requirements are inputs into a 
building blocks approach for the periodic 5 year review of NR, which translates these into costs 
and from this derives the gross revenue requirement of the company to deliver the set outputs 
and determine various things including access charges for freight and passenger train operators. 
We discuss this in more detail in the single till vs. dual till approach below. 
The business of carrying passengers was given to different train operators, in the form of 
franchises running designated routes into the network thus introducing competition for the 
market, rather than in the market. The franchises are granted by the Department for Transport 
(DfT), while ORR is responsible for enforcing the licences.  The owners of such franchises 
became regional monopolies in a designated part of the track for the duration of the franchise.   
Passenger train operators do not own their trains; instead they lease them from the ROSCOs, 
which were also privatised in 1994. Train operators pay the government for franchises and 
receive money from the government to subsidise access charges.  Franchises enjoy significant 
protection from changes in track access charges (a protection that open access operators, 
discussed below, do not have), but have limited flexibility as the franchise arrangements are 
highly specified.   
A small part of the passenger rail network is also open to competition in the market (open 
access). On the East Coast Main Line (ECML) there are two operators: Grant Central and First 
Hull trains. The existence of competition has led to substantial benefits by the route 
experiencing an almost double increase in passenger journeys (47%)  compared to that in routes 
with no competition (27%), a larger increase in revenue by ten percentage points , a smaller 
increase in average fares, while ECML operators top the list of passenger operators for 
passenger satisfaction (Lodge, 2013). More recently there has been more open access entry. 
Unlike franchising, ORR is responsible for open access route approvals in existing or new 
routes. Applications for open access in existing routes need to successfully make the case that 
entry will generate rather than divert traffic from the existing franchise holding operator. Any 
approval needs to ensure that there is no “crowding out” impact from the introduction of 
competition in the route and that the entry will have positive spill over effects by an increase 
in overall demand through an increase in passenger journeys and revenue, as well as an increase 
in passenger satisfaction. A NPA (“non-primarily abstractive”) test is used with a threshold of 
at least 30p new revenue generated to every pound extracted away from the incumbent 
operator, which along with the dynamic effects of competition should lead to an increase in 
consumer surplus while allowing a financially sustainable operation for both companies.  In 
addition any approval needs to ensure that the introduction of new services will not have an 
adverse impact on punctuality or create congestion into the network. 
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Unlike passenger train operators, there is strong competition in the freight market. This has led 
to improvement in investment and productivity leading to a reduction of unit costs by 35% 
between 1988/89 and 2008/09. Freight operators pay access charges too and unlike franchise 
holders of passenger trains have less protection from changes in access charges but receive 
indirect subsides.  
As the rail track is mixed usage accessed by both passenger and freight operators it is difficult 
to allocate costs and internalise benefits for companies; as a consequence NR is not responsive 
to the needs of its customers. A further reason for this is the fact that a big chunk of the 
government money goes to the NR in the form of a lump sum grant instead of being given to 
operators to buy services from NR. Therefore there is limited alignment of incentives between 
NR and the train operators and no clear view of what is paid for by the government. This raises 
the question of whether government subsidies should go directly to train operators, whose 
revenues are more closely tied to keeping passengers satisfied. The creation of a proper market 
between NR and its customers would introduce a sensible commercial framework for buying 
and selling which would incentivise both sides to keep costs down. It would also introduce cost 
transparency into the system as the re-direction of the lump sum grant into the form of direct 
train subsidies would involve raising track access charges, which are currently artificially much 
lower than they would have been if they reflected NR’s true costs (Rail Delivery Group, 
Review of Charges, May & November 2015).  
 
Single versus Dual Till Issues 
 
The “single till” and the “dual till” approach in economic regulation refers to the treatment of 
revenues that arise as a by-product of the company’s primary economic activity which is price 
regulated. These two terms are most familiar in the context of setting aeronautical charges, if 
the airport’s charges to airlines are regulated because the former has substantial market power, 
as is the case of Gatwick and Heathrow. Airports enjoy profits from commercial activities 
(retail space, car parking, etc.) as well as from aeronautical charges (typically including aircraft 
take off, landing, parking, terminal services, processing and screening of passengers). The UK 
airports regulator uses a single till regulation approach. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) 
considers that this better mimics what would normally happen in a fully functioning 
competitive market. To determine a fair price the regulatory till is determined by taking the 
total airport costs less the non-aeronautical revenues arising from commercial activities. On the 
other hand, the dual till approach sets the regulatory till as equal to the total airport costs less 
the non-aeronautical costs. (Frontier Economics, July 2014). 
A single till approach has merits as it seeks to emulate how competitive airport operators make 
price offers to airlines by taking into account retail and other revenue in deriving a net revenue 
requirement to be recovered from aeronautical charges (CAA, 2010). So it has the merit of 
keeping such charges low and this translates into lower ticket prices and hence allocative 
efficiency in the form of lower prices for passengers. A dual till approach on the other hand 
separates the commercial from the aviation-related activities of an airport. Such an approach 
may be preferable if encouraging investment in airport capacity is of primary importance. 
However unless the airport is properly price regulated, a dual till approach would essentially 
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imply a transfer of income from airlines and their passengers to airports leading to allocative 
inefficiency. 
Unlike airports, NR is a state owned company. ORR currently applies a single till approach in 
determining NR’s gross revenue requirement. The company has a substantial property & shops 
portfolio (it is the biggest small and medium enterprise landlord in the UK) and this generates 
10% of its revenue. So in addition to receiving the government grant and the access charges it 
has commercial income. Using a building blocks approach, the gross revenue requirement is 
determined as the sum of operating expenditure (i.e. opex which includes support, maintenance 
and operations costs),  an  amortisation allowance (set from capital expenditure (capex) 
consisting from renewals and enhancements costs; this translates into the Regulatory Asset 
Base (RAB) which in turn determines the amortisation allowance) and allowed return. 
Commercial income is then subtracted from the gross revenue requirement of the company, 
leading to a lower funding requirement. This translates into lower track access charges or/and 
into a smaller network grant by the government.  
As we discuss below in benchmarking, there are serious questions regarding the cost efficiency 
of NR in the beginning of the previous regulatory period (Control Period 4, CP4) and also in 
the first year of CP5.  Equally there are issues regarding NR’s ability to deliver infrastructure 
projects on time. The question is whether given that NR is a state owned company (and 
therefore any profits from commercial activities will in any case enter the government books), 
a dual till is a better approach rather that the existing single till approach.  A dual till approach 
may be a more effective instrument in stimulating more investment in increasing capacity, and 
providing a better incentive to minimise costs. As the company will be regulated on its rail 
costs, this will deprive NR of the “cushioning” effect of income from non–rail revenues and 
allow the regulator to set an effective incentive regime to drive improvements in cost 
efficiency. However it is more information demanding as it requires that shared and common 
costs should be split between rail and no rail related activities.  
Currently the BBC receives £3.7 billion as funding from the TV licence. It has income from 
commercial activities which comprise of:  
a) Its commercial subsidiary BBC Worldwide which - with the exception of large US 
studios - is the world’s largest distributor, and sells BBC content both in the UK and 
the rest of the world. Its revenues are around £1 billion per year. BBC Worldwide is 
able to access finance in the capital markets; however as it subject to public bodies’ 
spending rules, BBC Worldwide has a government imposed borrowing limit of £350 
million, which acts as a brake on the company’s ability to break big and expand in large 
overseas markets as in the US (DCMS Charter review, p. 123).  
b) The BBC generates around 90 million revenue from selling global news 
c) BBC studios and post production services which it rents out.  
 
As mentioned earlier BBC Worldwide sells both its own in house content as well as that of 
independent producers of BBC commissioned content. The profits are reinvested in the BBC 
to pursue its public purposes.  In 2014 Worldwide returned £227 million to the corporation. 
One of the practical issues that an independent external regulator will encounter in a price 
setting exercise - which would require it to calculate the size of the regulatory till and therefore 
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the licence fee itself - is to determine which of BBC’s revenue raising activities are core (i.e. 
directly linked to those funded by the licence fee and hence under economic regulation) and 
which are not. This is because BBC Worldwide sells BBC’s content domestically and abroad 
as well as transmitting it through BBC’s 9 domestic TV channels and online. Hence the 
question arises how to treat commercial revenues that arise from content financed by BBC’s 
regulated activity of content production for which it receives licence funding. This is crucial 
for price setting (i.e. licence fee) setting purposes. This is in addition to deciding whether a 
single or a dual till approach will be followed.  
If the BBC is economically regulated in its price setting by an external independent regulator 
who chooses a dual till approach, its commercial profits (which, given the above discussion, 
may be determined as all commercial revenue, or only the part of it that accrues through the 
revenues from non-licence fee financed content) will be subtracted from the regulatory till. 
This will imply a larger funding requirement by the corporation translated into a higher 
television licence fee. On the other hand, a single till approach simplifies income separation 
issues as all commercial income is subtracted from the regulatory till. This results into a much 
lower funding requirement for the corporation and hence a much lower licence fee. On the 
other hand, a dual till approach will give BBC the opportunity to use this commercial income 
to invest more on its content, quality and innovation.  The allocative inefficiency argument 
arising in a dual till arrangement no longer holds, as the corporation is an independent state 
company. Consequently, its objectives are public interest objectives, not profit maximisation 
as is the case in price regulated private companies such as airports, electricity transmission and 
distribution companies, water companies etc. So the former trade-off transforms itself into a 
dilemma between short run static benefit for licence holders through lower prices today versus 
dynamic benefits through enhanced services tomorrow. In other words, in the former case 
commercial revenues lead to reduction of the licence fee while in the latter (dual-till) case the 
BBC is allowed to keep these profits for further re-investment in promoting the six broad 
purposes mentioned in the introduction. Provided that the independent external regulator 
monitors the cost efficiency of the BBC through benchmarking, overspending by the 
corporation will be prevented by providing a link between benefits and spending as set out 
below.  
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Domestic and International Benchmarking  
 
Benchmarking is a regulatory approach to assessing the cost efficiency of a company that does 
not operate in a competitive market.  Benchmarking both identifies whether a firm is cost 
efficient relative to its peers as well as whether there is scope for cost efficiency improvements3 
and also can identify through comparison technologies and working methods that will allow 
the company to improve its productive efficiency. It also an essential ingredient in determining 
whether the target for costs savings over the control period, which will ultimately feed into the 
setting of prices, is both challenging and feasible by assessing the efficiency of the maintenance 
and renewals spend of the company. NR mainly outsources its enhancement work, uses a mix 
of outsourcing and in house renewal work, and does maintenance in house. International 
benchmarking has revealed that there are significant differences between NR and best practice 
international comparators in procurement (contracting) and possessions strategies where NR 
lags behind international best practice.  
As NR is a monopoly provider of track network this means that unlike say, electricity 
distribution firms, there are no domestic comparators to construct an efficiency frontier 
analysis. Instead for measuring its efficiency, ORR performs international benchmarking using 
data from European mainline infrastructure managers, comparing NR’s maintenance and 
renewal efficiency to that of other rail infrastructure companies in Europe.4 This makes the 
benchmarking work more challenging, as the analysis has to ensure that the comparisons are 
based on a like-for-like basis (ORR, 2010). 
The variables used for econometric cost benchmarking include cost data (total maintenance 
and renewals costs, excluding enhancement costs), output data (passenger train km, passenger 
tonne km, freight tonne km, tail tonne km, and total train km) and network features data (main 
track or route km, ratio of single track to track km, proportion of track electrified, number of 
switches per track km and stations per route km). 
The 2008 periodic review which set out NR’s outputs and funding levels for the 5- year Control 
Period 4 (i.e. CP4, 2009-14) used benchmarking which indicated that NR was around 40% less 
cost efficient than its top performing peers, while there was scope for an improvement by at 
least 21% in terms of efficiency improvement during the control period. This gap in efficiency 
was confirmed by a 2010 update using state of the art econometric modelling which showed 
that “… in 2008 NR was between 34%-40% less cost efficient than the top European 
                                                          
3 ORR’s efficieŶcy assessŵeŶt for NR for 2009-14 (Control Period 4) included 3 elements: catch up efficiency, 
frontier efficiency and input price inflation (ORR, 2010). The catch-up element is related to the expectation that 
NR can catch up to the levels of performance of the more cost-efficient companies in its peer group, while the 
frontier shift element is related to the expectation that over time, in addition to catch up NR should be able to 
improve its cost efficiency over time as all firms do. The first part is referred to in the economic literature as an 
increase in pseudo efficiency (i.e. a reduction in cost inefficiency) and the latter as a pure efficiency increase 
resulting from innovation and technological change, shifting the production frontier outwards. 
4 International benchmarking uses the LICB (Lasting Infrastructure Cost Benchmarking) data set compiled by the 
International Union of Railways.  The datasets comprised maintenance and renewals costs and other data for a 
total of 14 European rail infrastructure managers (of which 12 are used) including NR. 
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infrastructure managers in the peer group”5, which broadly confirmed the earlier result and the 
McNulty (2011) report on the efficiency of the rail industry as whole. The efficiency gap mostly 
stems from NR lagging behind it peer group in activities associated with procurement strategy 
(contracting) and possessions strategy. 
The 2013  periodic review (PR13) which used more recent models of efficiency and employed 
a wider range of models showed a NR efficiency gap from 13% to 25% which indicated an 
improvement, but also ample room for further improvement to reach the 40% in Control Period 
5 (CP5, 2014-19). Unfortunately the annual efficiency assessment for the first year of the 
period, i.e. 2014-15,  showed a reduction of 2.3% rather than an improvement in England and 
Wales relative to the previous year, while NR in Scotland was 1.1% less efficient than in the 
prior year. Efficiency shortfalls were in part due to renewals work costing more than expected, 
including for track, signalling and civil structures.  
ORR has also recently taken on the role of the efficiency monitor of Highways England (HE) 
which is a Central Government Company wholly funded by the state. ORR will be paid for its 
monitoring role by the government, unlike rail where it is paid for its role as a safety regulator 
by all companies operating in rail (including passenger train operators, both franchise holders 
and open access, freight train operators, the London Underground, NR etc.) and by the NR 
through its licence fee for its role as the economic regulator of NR. As a roads monitor its role 
will be primarily economic and less on safety, unlike rail where the ORR is the health and 
safety regulator for the whole industry. Moreover, unlike rail, there is no price setting as the 
road network is free to users at the point of use. Finally its geographical scope is smaller as, 
unlike the rail network, HE only manages the rail network of England. Hence the funding 
requirement for regulating the HE is significantly lower than in rail. On the other hand, the 
ORR will draw on the synergies between road and rail functions and will benefit in its role as 
monitor through its experience on rail by developing a joint up approach to enforcement and 
by drawing on expertise across the ORR in terms of asset management, safety management, 
efficiency monitoring and benchmarking. (ORR, 2015, pp. 26-27) 
Highways Agency became a government owned company, Highways England in 2015, 
through the Infrastructure Act 2015. It owns motorways and main ‘A’ roads. The government 
sets out the requirements in the form of the Road Investment Strategy (RIS) and the five-year 
statement of funds available (SoFAs).  Unlike the NR, HE has no further sources of income as 
the use of roads is free in England with the exception of the Dartford crossing tolls. ORR is 
responsible for promoting performance and efficiency in HE. As part of its monitoring duties 
the ORR should ensure delivery of the RIS, the outputs in the performance specification and 
the deliverables in the investment plan, oversee financial performance and efficiency and 
enforce the RIS and licence. It should also advice the government on any proposed future RIS 
in terms of whether it is sufficiently challenging but also feasible to achieve given the level of 
funding set by the government.  
In order to inform the future road investment strategies, ORR will need evaluate through the 
use of benchmarking the company’s efficiency to ensure value for money. The road users and 
those affected by the road network are to be represented by Transport Focus.  While the DfT 
                                                          
5 Efficiency benchmarking of Network Rail, ORR, http://orr.gov.uk/what-and-how-we-regulate/regulation-of-
network-rail/how-we-regulate-network-rail/periodic-review-2013/pr13-publications/efficiency-benchmarking-
of-network-rail, last accessed 14 December 2015. 
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will be responsible for setting the RIS, it will do so with input from the efficiency review of 
ORR and it may need to vary the RIS if required. Once the RIS is finalised, ORR will monitor 
and enforce its implementation by HE. 
Benchmarking on roads will need to focus on costs and outcomes, and to identify potential 
peers for benchmarking purposes. The ORR hopes to set benchmarking on the basis of 
comparators in other jurisdictions within the UK such as local authorities, as well as the 
infrastructure managers for Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. It will also do within 
benchmarking by comparing managerial approaches in different geographical locations, 
comparing specific functions of HE (such as IT) with comparators from other industries, as 
well as perform international benchmarking with international road infrastructure managers. 
The Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and Performance Indicators (PIs) as set in the 
monitoring framework document (ORR, 2015),  are linked to components of  monitoring and 
set targets where appropriate (Table 3.2. pp. 22-23) for the Performance Specification (e.g. 
number of fatalities, network availability, noise, cost savings, delivery plan progress, roads 
condition, etc.), the Investment Plan (delivery plan progress in investments, maintaining and 
renewing the network, and on ring-fenced investment funds such as environment, safety, 
innovation, air quality growth and housing) and licence compliance by HE.  
The role of Transport Focus is to feed into the process the road users’ feedback in terms of 
satisfaction rates, priorities on improvement and getting industry buy-in for action on behalf of 
the users. User feedback information on motorways and “A” roads is collated by categories: 
haulage (HGV) drivers, car and van drivers, as well as motorcyclists. This is because there are 
differences in the priorities of, say HGV drivers, where the quality of the road surfaces is a top 
priority (in fact this is a top concern for all user categories), as well as better management of 
unplanned delays such as accidents and breakdowns, and better managed roadworks, while the 
other categories of users place more emphasis on safer design and upkeep of roads, better 
behaved drivers, as well as comfort in driving, less noise, safety in poor weather. ORR will use 
such feedback in so far as it relates back to the KPIs. 
Unlike NR and HE, the BBC is not a monopoly neither in broadcasting nor in content provision. 
It competes domestically with other commercial PSBs (ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5) as well 
as over 70 channels in Freeview, satellite and cable providers, as well as television over the 
internet offerings such as Netflix, Amazon Prime etc. In a similar way to Transport Focus 
which collects and collates user feedback by types of road users, an audience watchdog agency 
should collect information on broadcasting evaluation by the public as the BBC Trust currently 
does. It is possible to have separation by categories of audience6, type of programme, 
broadcaster organisation and channels. According to van Meurs et al. (2006), it is possible to 
construct a quality mapping for the PSB system in a country in order to use as an instrument to 
compare among PSBs. This requires the spelling out of PSB’s range of services and the specific 
categories of audience it serves. The paper sets 8 dimensions as can be seen in Figure 1: 
programme quality, reliability, innovation, diversity in opinion, social interaction and impact 
                                                          
6
 In Netherlands, the Dutch Audience Research identifies categories of audience served by its state PSB channels 
(such as ambitious pleasure seeker, comfort seeking citizen, concerned citizen, participating citizen, firm believer, 
tolerant world citizen, carefree thrill seeker and concerned educator) by asking the sample audience questions 
regarding norms and values, interests, leisure activities, etc. and then finds the audience share of each PSB channel 
by life style group. 
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on society, cost efficiency and effectiveness. A quality mapping of television programmes can 
be performed by using the first six dimensions to evaluate the degree of appreciation of the 
audience sampled for different types of television programmes (news & current affairs, factual, 
sport, fiction etc.) in each dimension. On the other hand, cost efficiency and effectiveness can 
be compared between PSBs through the use of benchmarking techniques as discussed above 
for the case of rail and roads. It is also possible to measure the distinctiveness of a PSB by 
comparing the degree of genres balance (news and current affairs, factual, sports, drama, soaps, 
entertainment, comedy feature films) to show distinctiveness in provision in relation to 
commercial comparators.  
 
Figure 1: Quality Mapping  
 
Source: Fig. 3, p. 4, van Meurs et al., 2006. 
 
Benchmarking can be used to measure BBC’s cost efficiency relative to its domestic 
commercial competitors. It can also feed into of the corporation’s price determination periodic 
review performed by an external independent regulator, by setting a capped price in a way 
analogous to the methodology used by ORR in setting the RAB for NR, in a way that is both 
challenging for the company to induce further cost savings (dynamic efficiency gains) as the 
BBC strives to beat its price cap, as well as financially feasible and realistically set for the 
company to allow it to invest in quality and innovation.  
Similarly to what we have seen in rail and roads, a broadcaster can both set and measure 
performance through Key Performance Indicators. According to Barbuio (2008) KPIs in public 
broadcasters should be strategic/operational, result drivers (i.e. leading to output and/or 
outcomes), lead/lag (i.e. allowing for measures that are predictive of future performance) 
qualitative/quantitative (e.g. amount of television output by hours and by genre, quality of 
outputs by awards and audience feedback, etc.), and effectiveness/efficiency measuring 
whether the broadcaster meets its licence obligations and how efficiently available funding and 
resources are used to maximise outputs to ensure value for money. The paper stresses that good 
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KPIs should be controllable/accountable, relevant, verifiable, quantifiable, timely in informing 
decision making, accessible and cost effective to collect. 
The unique nature of the BBC as a broadcaster being non-commercial and funded by the licence 
fee means that it should not be benchmarked against commercial broadcasters only. It would 
also be useful to compare to broadcasters in other countries through international 
benchmarking. This reveals whether performance compares favourably to international peers 
or whether it can be improved using best practice as seen by broadcasters in the peer group. 
International benchmarking KPIs should share comparable metrics on key outputs, functions 
or processes in terms of effectiveness and efficiency as Table 1 indicates. By sharing such 
comparable metrics, through the use of benchmarking econometric techniques as already 
discussed for rail and roads, an independent external regulator will acquire additional 
information on the cost efficiency of the BBC relative to the corporation’s international PSB 
peers and hence one more very useful instrument for measuring cost efficiency and for price 
setting, in addition to the information from benchmarking using domestic comparators.  
 
Table 1: Effectiveness and Efficiency Metrics  
 
Effectiveness Efficiency  
% of National Content  Cost per production hour 
 
Reach % of overheads against total expenditure 
% of Output hours (broadcast) by genre Cost per broadcast hour 
 Cost per consumed hour 
 
 Cost per viewer/listener 
 
 Utilisation of production resources 
 
 Output per employee 
 
Source: pp. 19-20, Barbuio, 2008. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have looked at how the ORR, an independent economic regulator, regulates rail and road, 
and in particular the two state companies, Network Rail and Highways England. The sources 
of funding for these two companies are different with the main component coming from the 
government, whereas BBC is funded through the licence fee, and therefore independent. We 
report on the main features of the economic regulation of NR and the economic monitoring of 
HE, to study the lessons of ex ante and ex post regulation. We note how the ORR regulates 
these two companies; in the case of NR it determines through the periodic cost review  access 
charges and, through monitoring NR’s cost efficiency using international benchmarking, 
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advises  the government whether the company can realistically deliver the set outcomes given 
its funding. It will also advise the government on the funding requirement of HE and will 
benchmark the company using alternative groups of comparators to ensure that the HE delivers 
best value for money. We draw out and discuss the common themes of benchmarking, single 
and dual till approaches, crowding out effects and internal market operation in rail and roads, 
and explain how this relates to the BBC in the case that it is regulated by an independent 
external regulator. 
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